McCrea looks at Starcraft strategies in Korea from the outside, as a fan fo the game but not a Korean scholar. He is interested in meta-narratives of play, and argues that the game itself is largely responsible for its popularity in Korea, not any "ephemeral cultural reason." However, the stakes of the game are local.
He argues against Galloway, who examines the game of Starcraft, but neglects how it is played. Galloway considers the structure of the game, and its theme. He analyzes the Zerg as a rhizomatic force, and looks at how the game is balanced. McCrea argues that it is not the balance but lack thereof that tells how the game is played, as players seek to take advantage of one another.
He sees Starcraft pro-gamers as involved in a narrative of strategy and fame. Like Geertz's 'center bet' in Deep Play, he argues that strategy and fame are the 'means and device' of Starcraft deep play in Korea. He cites the example of a new and surprising tactic (Terran bunker rush) in a professional match that took the opponent totally by surprise. More than winning a match, what was at stake was the player's reputations and their skills - one player's inability to adapt to the tactic led to his defeat, and the success of the other player made him a legend.
I like this article because it looks at gameplay itself rather than themes. It shows how gameplay can be 'objectively' good and consistent around the world, but a culture can create all-new stakes for the game. This may be an angle to take in my work: what are the stakes for players of EVE?
Thursday, June 9, 2011
Dean Chan - Beyond the "Great Firewall": The Case of In-Game Protests in China
This article is part of the conversation about the Internet, civil society, and democratization in China. Like Guobin Yang and Jack Linchuan Qiu, the article questions the deterministic and teleological view that the development of the Internet will lead to democratization. Yang prefers to examine the "co-development" of Internet and civil society, which effect each other. Qiu sees the Internet as a "conduit" for the "existing propensities" of Chinese society. Chan recognizes the importance of the Internet not because it is merely a new "strategy" but also a new "field of struggle".
Chan places these protests in context: other protests argue against game practices like griefing, developer choices like nerfing or policies like forbidding homosexual weddings. In game protests are more than consumer dissatisfaction, since players make emotional investments into the game.
Chan wants to challenge the "emergent Western Techno-Orientalist discourses" about gaming in China that are inevitably condemnations of Beijing in the name of liberal democracy (as compared to Japan and Korea, discourses about which are merely fetishistic). But, Chan points out, China's government has been "nurturing" the rise of consumerism.
The two protests Chan uses as examples actually have little to do with protests against the government. The first is a protest against developers for censoring anti-Japanese sentiment in Fantasy Westward Journey. The second deals with social condemnation of a love triangle that began in-game. The main point is that in-game protests deal with things outside the game as well.
A throwaway line in the last paragraph makes the most interesting point: that Chinese in-game protests thus far have been transitory and focused on single events. There is no organized long-term movement (democratizing or otherwise) in-game.
Chan places these protests in context: other protests argue against game practices like griefing, developer choices like nerfing or policies like forbidding homosexual weddings. In game protests are more than consumer dissatisfaction, since players make emotional investments into the game.
Chan wants to challenge the "emergent Western Techno-Orientalist discourses" about gaming in China that are inevitably condemnations of Beijing in the name of liberal democracy (as compared to Japan and Korea, discourses about which are merely fetishistic). But, Chan points out, China's government has been "nurturing" the rise of consumerism.
The two protests Chan uses as examples actually have little to do with protests against the government. The first is a protest against developers for censoring anti-Japanese sentiment in Fantasy Westward Journey. The second deals with social condemnation of a love triangle that began in-game. The main point is that in-game protests deal with things outside the game as well.
A throwaway line in the last paragraph makes the most interesting point: that Chinese in-game protests thus far have been transitory and focused on single events. There is no organized long-term movement (democratizing or otherwise) in-game.
Jun-Sok Huhh - the "Bang" Where Korean Online Gaming Began
The Korean government encouraged the development of broadband connection as a gateway into the 'information age'. Starcraft was distributed for free during the economic downturn, capturing the interest of broke young men in PC bangs. These netcafes allowed players to play with friends. Bangs and game publishers cooperated to give mass subscriptions to the netcafes. This has led to more offline socializing surrounding gaming in Korea, but this article does not describe this socializing.
This article would go in a list following the statement: "Business and government have had a major influence on the development of gaming cultures." Can't think of much other use for me.
This article would go in a list following the statement: "Business and government have had a major influence on the development of gaming cultures." Can't think of much other use for me.
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
Ng Wai-ming, Consuming and Localizing Japanese Combat Games in Hong Kong
This article looks at the localization of Japanese fighting games (particularly Street Fighter and King of Fighters) by players in Hong Kong. There are essentially two different kinds of localization covered: (1) Local norms of play and arcade culture, (2) adaptation of the stories and characters of the Japanese games into Hong Kong media, such as films and comic books.
The article begins with an in-depth history of the two games in Hong Kong, with some info about how the games penetrated HK culture, including the popularity of the games and derivative material, tracing the waning influence of SF compared to KOF.
The second section looks at HK arcade culture. This includes gamer jargon, which is borrowed mostly from 'lower-class' or 'vulgar' words, due to the games' popularity with lower-class urban youth and gaming centers in poor districts, where fighting games gave a high rate of return. Ng argues that gaming jargons preserve a sense of Hong Kong locality as players play imported games. House rules further localize the gameplay. For example, it is considered polite for a skilled player to purposefully lose the second round of a match so that both players can play a third round; other house rules ban the use of bugs. Ng says that Japan lacks these rules because Japanese players are more 'harmonious' and usually play these games by themselves or with friends. Also, because arcades are more socially acceptable in Japan, they lack the 'lower class' and 'underground' rules and languages.
The third section looks at adaptations of the games into HK kung-fu comics. Artists borrowed characters from SF and KOF, or used kung-fu literature tropes in licensed fighting game comics.
One of the article's main points is that the popularity of Japanese games in Hong Kong is not a form of cultural imperialism, since the adaptation of these games is conducted primarily by Hong Kong business owners, artists and players. I would like to know more about the impact that Japanese companies do have on the localization process (see: Jonathan Corliss)
The article begins with an in-depth history of the two games in Hong Kong, with some info about how the games penetrated HK culture, including the popularity of the games and derivative material, tracing the waning influence of SF compared to KOF.
The second section looks at HK arcade culture. This includes gamer jargon, which is borrowed mostly from 'lower-class' or 'vulgar' words, due to the games' popularity with lower-class urban youth and gaming centers in poor districts, where fighting games gave a high rate of return. Ng argues that gaming jargons preserve a sense of Hong Kong locality as players play imported games. House rules further localize the gameplay. For example, it is considered polite for a skilled player to purposefully lose the second round of a match so that both players can play a third round; other house rules ban the use of bugs. Ng says that Japan lacks these rules because Japanese players are more 'harmonious' and usually play these games by themselves or with friends. Also, because arcades are more socially acceptable in Japan, they lack the 'lower class' and 'underground' rules and languages.
The third section looks at adaptations of the games into HK kung-fu comics. Artists borrowed characters from SF and KOF, or used kung-fu literature tropes in licensed fighting game comics.
One of the article's main points is that the popularity of Japanese games in Hong Kong is not a form of cultural imperialism, since the adaptation of these games is conducted primarily by Hong Kong business owners, artists and players. I would like to know more about the impact that Japanese companies do have on the localization process (see: Jonathan Corliss)
Friday, June 3, 2011
Kipnis, Andrew B. - Subjectification and education for quality in China
This article looks at practices of social practices of suzhi (quality) in education reform in China as a way to argue that neoliberal policy does not necessarily make for neoliberal subjects. He is arguing against scholars who look only at 'text' of government (ie.: policy) to talk about neoliberal subjects, without actually looking at the practice of subjectification.
Specifically, Kipnis is looking at "educating for 'quality'" in Chinese schools. Where quality is seen as something that justifies power, but is otherwise loosely-defined. Suzhi is used as justification for neoliberal reforms in education, emphasizing individual entrepreneurship and creativity. This is seen as a path to creating a "Chinese Bill Gates." On the other hand, authoritarian education, the 'opposite' of neoliberalism, is still important, if only for the maintenance of loyalty to the CCP. Kipnis examines this contradiction between neoliberal and authoritarian educational practice.
Good definitions of a lot of terms:
Subjectification:According to Rabinow, Subjectification is "the interrelation among scientific modes of classifying people, the dividing practices of governments, and the means by which human beings objectify and act upon themselves". Subjectification = Scientific classification + dividing practices of government + self-objectification and -action.
Governmentality: working through subjectification to create self-disciplining subjects.
Neoliberalism governs by 'responsibilitizing' subject/citizens, although they believe they are rejecting government
Kipnis finds three interesting subjectivities created by the Chinese educational system:
1. filial subjects
2. homeroom subjects
3. dropout subjects
In the first (filial students) teachers emphasize student's duty to their parents, who sacrificed so much so that the students could study. Students see their duty not to the state, but to their families. In the second, neoliberal desire to treat all students equally backfires by making them rely on each other, fostering a sense of community. Dropouts disparage the authoritarian exam system, so in some ways this is the most neoliberal subject position.
One current that runs beneath the article that I think would be interesting to draw out more is the idea of neoliberal policy being 'Western' versus 'traditional' Chinese authoritarian educational practice, as well as other comparisons between the 'West' and 'China'. For example, dropouts believe in their individual ability to succeed outside of the authoritarian university system, seeming to be the most 'neoliberal' of subjects, but their ideologies reflect a classic Chinese character - the 'man of action' who is opposed to the 'book-stupid' intellectuals. The importance of teaching 'filiality' calls back to classic values as well. 'Authoritarianism' and 'neoliberalism' are not the whole product of CCP and 'the West'
Specifically, Kipnis is looking at "educating for 'quality'" in Chinese schools. Where quality is seen as something that justifies power, but is otherwise loosely-defined. Suzhi is used as justification for neoliberal reforms in education, emphasizing individual entrepreneurship and creativity. This is seen as a path to creating a "Chinese Bill Gates." On the other hand, authoritarian education, the 'opposite' of neoliberalism, is still important, if only for the maintenance of loyalty to the CCP. Kipnis examines this contradiction between neoliberal and authoritarian educational practice.
Good definitions of a lot of terms:
Subjectification:According to Rabinow, Subjectification is "the interrelation among scientific modes of classifying people, the dividing practices of governments, and the means by which human beings objectify and act upon themselves". Subjectification = Scientific classification + dividing practices of government + self-objectification and -action.
Governmentality: working through subjectification to create self-disciplining subjects.
Neoliberalism governs by 'responsibilitizing' subject/citizens, although they believe they are rejecting government
Kipnis finds three interesting subjectivities created by the Chinese educational system:
1. filial subjects
2. homeroom subjects
3. dropout subjects
In the first (filial students) teachers emphasize student's duty to their parents, who sacrificed so much so that the students could study. Students see their duty not to the state, but to their families. In the second, neoliberal desire to treat all students equally backfires by making them rely on each other, fostering a sense of community. Dropouts disparage the authoritarian exam system, so in some ways this is the most neoliberal subject position.
One current that runs beneath the article that I think would be interesting to draw out more is the idea of neoliberal policy being 'Western' versus 'traditional' Chinese authoritarian educational practice, as well as other comparisons between the 'West' and 'China'. For example, dropouts believe in their individual ability to succeed outside of the authoritarian university system, seeming to be the most 'neoliberal' of subjects, but their ideologies reflect a classic Chinese character - the 'man of action' who is opposed to the 'book-stupid' intellectuals. The importance of teaching 'filiality' calls back to classic values as well. 'Authoritarianism' and 'neoliberalism' are not the whole product of CCP and 'the West'
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Donath - Identity and Deception in the Virtual World
This 1996 article by Judith S. Donath examines identity and deception in Usenet. It is quite ethnographic, describing Usenet handles, signatures and slang.
Donath describes several aspects of Usenet groups that are important for understanding identity and deception.
One important theoretical concept is Amotz Zahavi's concept of reliable and unreliable signals, and the 'Handicap principle' that some signals are optimal and reliable indicators of the truth. Assessment signals are signals that are costly and directly related to the trait advertised, like big horns or a thick neck advertising strength. Conventional signals are signals by convention, like a t-shirt or an email signature, and low-cost but unreliable. Of course, this is only a framework to begin discussing the complexities of Usenet posting.
Headers, writing style, signatures can all be signals of a person's true identity.
"Trolling is a game about identity deception, albeit one that is played without the consent of most of the players." A good troll makes people believe that somebody could really be that clueless.
Others want to be seen as somebody they are not: a bodybuilder or a master hacker. Usenet can have assessment signals that protect groups - the hacker group requires users to hack the newsgroup system in order to post. Some don't want to be seen at all, because of a sensitive topic or more general concerns with privacy.
4chan's /b/ and 'Anonymous' form an interesting counterpoint to this article. Despite nearly all of the participants lacking personal identities, Anon has a very highly developed collective identity. Identity may be important, but it does not necessarily need to be singular.
/b/ may also be a place where conventional signals are almost entirely useless. Only truly being aware of the memes and skills of an oldbie can identify one as such. Ie. 'triforcing'
Donath describes several aspects of Usenet groups that are important for understanding identity and deception.
One important theoretical concept is Amotz Zahavi's concept of reliable and unreliable signals, and the 'Handicap principle' that some signals are optimal and reliable indicators of the truth. Assessment signals are signals that are costly and directly related to the trait advertised, like big horns or a thick neck advertising strength. Conventional signals are signals by convention, like a t-shirt or an email signature, and low-cost but unreliable. Of course, this is only a framework to begin discussing the complexities of Usenet posting.
Headers, writing style, signatures can all be signals of a person's true identity.
"Trolling is a game about identity deception, albeit one that is played without the consent of most of the players." A good troll makes people believe that somebody could really be that clueless.
Others want to be seen as somebody they are not: a bodybuilder or a master hacker. Usenet can have assessment signals that protect groups - the hacker group requires users to hack the newsgroup system in order to post. Some don't want to be seen at all, because of a sensitive topic or more general concerns with privacy.
4chan's /b/ and 'Anonymous' form an interesting counterpoint to this article. Despite nearly all of the participants lacking personal identities, Anon has a very highly developed collective identity. Identity may be important, but it does not necessarily need to be singular.
/b/ may also be a place where conventional signals are almost entirely useless. Only truly being aware of the memes and skills of an oldbie can identify one as such. Ie. 'triforcing'
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Wolfendale, Jessica - Virtual Harm and Attachment
Avatar attachment and the possibility of virtual harm has been dismissed by some writers, Wolfendale argues. But it is because players are attached to their avatars that immoral actions can occur. Harm must occur to a real person, but avatars are virtual, so therefore for avatar harm to be real it must travel through the avatar to affect the real person. Virtual harm is minimized by earlier writers by assuming avatar attachment is not as meaningful as other kinds of attachement, like to property.
Actions in VW are real because they are speech acts with intention and action. They have 'illocutionary' (intention) and 'perlocutionary' (social effect and significance) force. Avatars are 'conduits' for this force as well as reflexive acts of a player, who redefines himself by experimenting with identities online.
Belief over appropriate and inappropriate avatar violence demonstrates that avatar violence has real moral consequences. That is to say, some avatar violence has been normalized, other violence is outlawed.
An avatar creates a sense of virtual presence.
Avatar attachment does not cause internet addiction or withdrawal from normal social relations. She cites several studies to this effect.
The article needs a sense of the alternate uses of avatars. Not everyone identifies strongly with their avatar. The avatar can be a tool, as in a MMOG. The article is talking about a specific kind of world and a specific kind of attachment, where creating a virtual space and self with significance is the goal. She argues that 3D worlds cause greater avatar identification but this is not necessarily the case, if the world is of a different genre or the player has alternative goals. Griefers form no such attachment to their avatars; MMOGs operationalize avatars into tools for success. Attachment requires a set of shared symbolic values, it is not emergent from the 3D space.
One distinction I think is not clearly made in this article is the difference between harm to the avatar and harm to the player, which can obviously become confused, but can also be an important distinction. I think there's a difference on folk-understanding level between harm to the avatar, being killed in a MMOG, and harm to the player, like the LambdaMOO rape.
That is to say, we should be careful not to conflate the actions of and on avatars with the actions of and on players. Using frame theory: the frame of the avatar is within the frame of the player which is within the frame of the person. A person could be harmed through a VW directly, like if someone's boyfriend broke up with them over WoW. A player could be harmed by being called a noob or being left out of a guild. An avatar could be harmed by being attacked and killed, but this would not harm the player unless they took it personally. If the act is just 'part of the game' (the avatar frame) then the attack can be compartmentalized. Griefing attacks are designed to harm someone on a player or personal level. Corpse-camping or insta-killing attacks the player frame by interrupting the play practice. Games and play serve to build up the division between avatar and self. Thus, typical reactions of people to being 'too attached' to your avatar. We have a cultural assumption that play is distinct from reality that results in building these frames of person/player/avatar.
Actions in VW are real because they are speech acts with intention and action. They have 'illocutionary' (intention) and 'perlocutionary' (social effect and significance) force. Avatars are 'conduits' for this force as well as reflexive acts of a player, who redefines himself by experimenting with identities online.
Belief over appropriate and inappropriate avatar violence demonstrates that avatar violence has real moral consequences. That is to say, some avatar violence has been normalized, other violence is outlawed.
An avatar creates a sense of virtual presence.
Avatar attachment does not cause internet addiction or withdrawal from normal social relations. She cites several studies to this effect.
The article needs a sense of the alternate uses of avatars. Not everyone identifies strongly with their avatar. The avatar can be a tool, as in a MMOG. The article is talking about a specific kind of world and a specific kind of attachment, where creating a virtual space and self with significance is the goal. She argues that 3D worlds cause greater avatar identification but this is not necessarily the case, if the world is of a different genre or the player has alternative goals. Griefers form no such attachment to their avatars; MMOGs operationalize avatars into tools for success. Attachment requires a set of shared symbolic values, it is not emergent from the 3D space.
One distinction I think is not clearly made in this article is the difference between harm to the avatar and harm to the player, which can obviously become confused, but can also be an important distinction. I think there's a difference on folk-understanding level between harm to the avatar, being killed in a MMOG, and harm to the player, like the LambdaMOO rape.
That is to say, we should be careful not to conflate the actions of and on avatars with the actions of and on players. Using frame theory: the frame of the avatar is within the frame of the player which is within the frame of the person. A person could be harmed through a VW directly, like if someone's boyfriend broke up with them over WoW. A player could be harmed by being called a noob or being left out of a guild. An avatar could be harmed by being attacked and killed, but this would not harm the player unless they took it personally. If the act is just 'part of the game' (the avatar frame) then the attack can be compartmentalized. Griefing attacks are designed to harm someone on a player or personal level. Corpse-camping or insta-killing attacks the player frame by interrupting the play practice. Games and play serve to build up the division between avatar and self. Thus, typical reactions of people to being 'too attached' to your avatar. We have a cultural assumption that play is distinct from reality that results in building these frames of person/player/avatar.
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