This 1996 article by Judith S. Donath examines identity and deception in Usenet. It is quite ethnographic, describing Usenet handles, signatures and slang.
Donath describes several aspects of Usenet groups that are important for understanding identity and deception.
One important theoretical concept is Amotz Zahavi's concept of reliable and unreliable signals, and the 'Handicap principle' that some signals are optimal and reliable indicators of the truth. Assessment signals are signals that are costly and directly related to the trait advertised, like big horns or a thick neck advertising strength. Conventional signals are signals by convention, like a t-shirt or an email signature, and low-cost but unreliable. Of course, this is only a framework to begin discussing the complexities of Usenet posting.
Headers, writing style, signatures can all be signals of a person's true identity.
"Trolling is a game about identity deception, albeit one that is played without the consent of most of the players." A good troll makes people believe that somebody could really be that clueless.
Others want to be seen as somebody they are not: a bodybuilder or a master hacker. Usenet can have assessment signals that protect groups - the hacker group requires users to hack the newsgroup system in order to post. Some don't want to be seen at all, because of a sensitive topic or more general concerns with privacy.
4chan's /b/ and 'Anonymous' form an interesting counterpoint to this article. Despite nearly all of the participants lacking personal identities, Anon has a very highly developed collective identity. Identity may be important, but it does not necessarily need to be singular.
/b/ may also be a place where conventional signals are almost entirely useless. Only truly being aware of the memes and skills of an oldbie can identify one as such. Ie. 'triforcing'
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Wolfendale, Jessica - Virtual Harm and Attachment
Avatar attachment and the possibility of virtual harm has been dismissed by some writers, Wolfendale argues. But it is because players are attached to their avatars that immoral actions can occur. Harm must occur to a real person, but avatars are virtual, so therefore for avatar harm to be real it must travel through the avatar to affect the real person. Virtual harm is minimized by earlier writers by assuming avatar attachment is not as meaningful as other kinds of attachement, like to property.
Actions in VW are real because they are speech acts with intention and action. They have 'illocutionary' (intention) and 'perlocutionary' (social effect and significance) force. Avatars are 'conduits' for this force as well as reflexive acts of a player, who redefines himself by experimenting with identities online.
Belief over appropriate and inappropriate avatar violence demonstrates that avatar violence has real moral consequences. That is to say, some avatar violence has been normalized, other violence is outlawed.
An avatar creates a sense of virtual presence.
Avatar attachment does not cause internet addiction or withdrawal from normal social relations. She cites several studies to this effect.
The article needs a sense of the alternate uses of avatars. Not everyone identifies strongly with their avatar. The avatar can be a tool, as in a MMOG. The article is talking about a specific kind of world and a specific kind of attachment, where creating a virtual space and self with significance is the goal. She argues that 3D worlds cause greater avatar identification but this is not necessarily the case, if the world is of a different genre or the player has alternative goals. Griefers form no such attachment to their avatars; MMOGs operationalize avatars into tools for success. Attachment requires a set of shared symbolic values, it is not emergent from the 3D space.
One distinction I think is not clearly made in this article is the difference between harm to the avatar and harm to the player, which can obviously become confused, but can also be an important distinction. I think there's a difference on folk-understanding level between harm to the avatar, being killed in a MMOG, and harm to the player, like the LambdaMOO rape.
That is to say, we should be careful not to conflate the actions of and on avatars with the actions of and on players. Using frame theory: the frame of the avatar is within the frame of the player which is within the frame of the person. A person could be harmed through a VW directly, like if someone's boyfriend broke up with them over WoW. A player could be harmed by being called a noob or being left out of a guild. An avatar could be harmed by being attacked and killed, but this would not harm the player unless they took it personally. If the act is just 'part of the game' (the avatar frame) then the attack can be compartmentalized. Griefing attacks are designed to harm someone on a player or personal level. Corpse-camping or insta-killing attacks the player frame by interrupting the play practice. Games and play serve to build up the division between avatar and self. Thus, typical reactions of people to being 'too attached' to your avatar. We have a cultural assumption that play is distinct from reality that results in building these frames of person/player/avatar.
Actions in VW are real because they are speech acts with intention and action. They have 'illocutionary' (intention) and 'perlocutionary' (social effect and significance) force. Avatars are 'conduits' for this force as well as reflexive acts of a player, who redefines himself by experimenting with identities online.
Belief over appropriate and inappropriate avatar violence demonstrates that avatar violence has real moral consequences. That is to say, some avatar violence has been normalized, other violence is outlawed.
An avatar creates a sense of virtual presence.
Avatar attachment does not cause internet addiction or withdrawal from normal social relations. She cites several studies to this effect.
The article needs a sense of the alternate uses of avatars. Not everyone identifies strongly with their avatar. The avatar can be a tool, as in a MMOG. The article is talking about a specific kind of world and a specific kind of attachment, where creating a virtual space and self with significance is the goal. She argues that 3D worlds cause greater avatar identification but this is not necessarily the case, if the world is of a different genre or the player has alternative goals. Griefers form no such attachment to their avatars; MMOGs operationalize avatars into tools for success. Attachment requires a set of shared symbolic values, it is not emergent from the 3D space.
One distinction I think is not clearly made in this article is the difference between harm to the avatar and harm to the player, which can obviously become confused, but can also be an important distinction. I think there's a difference on folk-understanding level between harm to the avatar, being killed in a MMOG, and harm to the player, like the LambdaMOO rape.
That is to say, we should be careful not to conflate the actions of and on avatars with the actions of and on players. Using frame theory: the frame of the avatar is within the frame of the player which is within the frame of the person. A person could be harmed through a VW directly, like if someone's boyfriend broke up with them over WoW. A player could be harmed by being called a noob or being left out of a guild. An avatar could be harmed by being attacked and killed, but this would not harm the player unless they took it personally. If the act is just 'part of the game' (the avatar frame) then the attack can be compartmentalized. Griefing attacks are designed to harm someone on a player or personal level. Corpse-camping or insta-killing attacks the player frame by interrupting the play practice. Games and play serve to build up the division between avatar and self. Thus, typical reactions of people to being 'too attached' to your avatar. We have a cultural assumption that play is distinct from reality that results in building these frames of person/player/avatar.
Dib, Lina - The Blog as a Technology of the Self
In this conference presentation, Lina Dib explores the idea that blogs can be 'technologies of the self', as Foucault described Ancient Greek diaries (hypomnemata). Dib is actually talking about a specific genre of blogs - the personal blog, or blog-as-diary. Her analysis would have difficulty incorporating political blogs, academic blogs, etc.
Blog is a work in progress. It is always unfinished, much like the self. Thus the blog is a continual process of self-care.
Blog as a collection of discourses. Where Greek culture was affected by the "prevalence of personal discourses" hypomnemata were used to care for the self by creating a collage of relevant material. Material must be sifted through in order to draw out that which is relevant to the self.
In blogs, the connection between the self and others is made apparent by use of hyperlinks. It is impossible to read a blog outside of the context of the network.
Blog as public. It puts the self on exhibition. The reactions of others generates reflexivity. This is a so-called "paradox" - the self requires the other to understand itself. This is an extension of the blog as a collection. It takes the discourses of others and presents it to others. This is in some way a creative act of the self. (I should link this to Ames' concept of 'creativity' in Confucian philosophy. As I recall, he argues that true creativity is only possible in an immanent worldview. If the discourses of others can only be 'others', then relaying cannot be a creative act. But if the self is defined by the discourses of others, then creativity is possible. Something like that?)
Blogs straddle borders between public and private, national and transnational. De Kerckhove states: “Computers have created a new kind of intermediate cognition, a bridge of continuous interactions, a corpus callosum between the outside world and our inner selves”. The blog serves to connect the 'inner self' with the 'outside world', presuming the existence of both of these things and the division between them. I would hypothesize that in the Classical Chinese tradition such a division is not present, and therefore there is no paradox to resolve, no bridge to build. Therefore the blog as a tool to resolve this division is a particularly Western concern.
Dib concludes by questioning the ability of the blog to preserve memory. Plato doubts the ability of writing to preserve memory. Writing leads one to forget what one records, gaining only a 'receipt' for the memory. This is not entirely related to her previous arguments, instead being a 'preview' of her current work on digital archives. You can see how they relate, though: questioning Western concerns and assumptions in the use of technology. Here: the self as independent identity, there: the archive as attempt at eternal preservation.
Blog is a work in progress. It is always unfinished, much like the self. Thus the blog is a continual process of self-care.
Blog as a collection of discourses. Where Greek culture was affected by the "prevalence of personal discourses" hypomnemata were used to care for the self by creating a collage of relevant material. Material must be sifted through in order to draw out that which is relevant to the self.
In blogs, the connection between the self and others is made apparent by use of hyperlinks. It is impossible to read a blog outside of the context of the network.
Blog as public. It puts the self on exhibition. The reactions of others generates reflexivity. This is a so-called "paradox" - the self requires the other to understand itself. This is an extension of the blog as a collection. It takes the discourses of others and presents it to others. This is in some way a creative act of the self. (I should link this to Ames' concept of 'creativity' in Confucian philosophy. As I recall, he argues that true creativity is only possible in an immanent worldview. If the discourses of others can only be 'others', then relaying cannot be a creative act. But if the self is defined by the discourses of others, then creativity is possible. Something like that?)
Blogs straddle borders between public and private, national and transnational. De Kerckhove states: “Computers have created a new kind of intermediate cognition, a bridge of continuous interactions, a corpus callosum between the outside world and our inner selves”. The blog serves to connect the 'inner self' with the 'outside world', presuming the existence of both of these things and the division between them. I would hypothesize that in the Classical Chinese tradition such a division is not present, and therefore there is no paradox to resolve, no bridge to build. Therefore the blog as a tool to resolve this division is a particularly Western concern.
Dib concludes by questioning the ability of the blog to preserve memory. Plato doubts the ability of writing to preserve memory. Writing leads one to forget what one records, gaining only a 'receipt' for the memory. This is not entirely related to her previous arguments, instead being a 'preview' of her current work on digital archives. You can see how they relate, though: questioning Western concerns and assumptions in the use of technology. Here: the self as independent identity, there: the archive as attempt at eternal preservation.
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